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The emergence of factoryless manufacturers in the world economy has given rise to a new 
mode of exporting services of intangible assets by multinational corporations, which has 
challenged the reliability of conventional trade statistics for the measurement of value chain 
trade. This study finds that even though Apple, the largest factoryless manufacturer in the world, 
sells billions of dollars products in the Chinese and Japanese markets, the official trade 
statistics do not count any of the sales as US exports to those two countries. The same is true 
for Nike, the largest seller of athletic footwear and apparel in the world. Using a hypothetical 
case of iPhone trade, the study provides an intuitive illustration of the failure of official trade 
statistics to record trade in intangible assets by factoryless manufacturers. For an appropriate 
evaluation of the contribution of factoryless manufacturers to international trade, this study 
estimates the exports in services of intangible assets by the American factoryless manufacturers, 
Apple, Nike, AMD, Cisco and Qualcomm. The estimation shows that in 2018 the five 
companies exported $70.3 billion in intangible asset services, equivalent to 8.2% of US exports 
in services as reported by official trade statistics. From the perspective of  US-China economic 
relations, in 2018 Apple, Nike, AMD and Qualcomm sold to Chinese customers $27.9 billion 
services of intangible assets, equal to 48.9% of US service exports to China as reported by 
official trade statistics. Counting those exports as part of US exports to China would reduce 
the US trade deficit with the country by 7.3%.  
 









1. Introduction  
Trade along global value chains (GVCs) constitutes a new international division of labor, 
where lead firms specialize in high-value added tasks such as research and development (R&D), 
product design, branding, marketing, and retailing, while non-lead firms transform raw 
materials; manufacture parts and components; and assemble and test final products. As a result 
of their adoption of GVC strategy, more and more multinational corporations (MNCs), 
especially those from industrialized nations, have evolved into factoryless centers of product 
design, technology innovation, brand development, marketing, and retailing. Factoryless 
manufacturers, also referred as factoryless goods producers, generally have no production 
facilities, but they own the rights to the intellectual property (IP) or design of the products 
assembled/made by contract manufacturers. By holding monopolies on intangible assets, 
factoryless manufacturers control the manufacturing process and retain ownership of their 
products (Bayard, Byrne and Smith, 2015). Typical factoryless manufacturers include the 
world's largest consumer electronics maker, Apple; world No.1 athletic shoe maker Nike; 
fabless semiconductor manufacturer Advanced Micro Device (AMD); Japan’s largest fashion 
producer, Fast Retailing Co.; and Swedish clothing retailer Hennes & Maurita AB. Factoryless 
manufacturing is also very common in the pharmaceutical industry. A survey of North 
American and European pharmaceutical companies reveals that a quarter of these companies 
outsourced all of their production (Coyle and Nguyen, 2020). 
 
The global operations of factoryless manufacturers have not only amplified trade flows of 
intermediate goods; they have also created a new business model—selling services of 
intangible assets to international customers via tangible products assembled/made by foreign 
contract manufacturers. The emergence of factoryless manufacturing has extended the range 
of traditional exchanges of final goods and primary products between nations, to include trade 
in services of intangibles; this has significantly strengthened the role of intangible assets in 
international trade. This new export mode challenges the validity and appropriateness of 
current trade statistics system for the measurement of value chain trade.  
 
Trade statistics are generally calculated on the basis of the value of goods crossing national 
borders. If goods are shipped from a country across its borders and declared to its customs, the 
shipment is recorded as an export from that country, i.e. the physical crossing of a national 
border is a necessary criterion for including the value of such goods in trade statistics. For 
instance, the compilation of International Trade in Goods Statistics in the European Union 
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draws primarily on customs records, which basically mirror the physical movement of goods 
across borders (UNECE, 2015). Crossing home country's borders, however, is no longer 
necessary for factoryless manufacturers to export their products to international markets, since 
all of their products are assembled/made by foreign contract manufacturers and shipped to 
international markets from where those products are produced. In other words, GVC strategy 
enables factoryless manufacturers to export goods without those goods crossing their home 
countries’ borders. Moreover, since factoryless manufacturers retain ownership of their 
products assembled by contract manufacturers until the products are sold to end users, when 
contract manufacturers ship those products to foreign upstream firms, or the end consumers in 
international markets, they only declare to customs the cost of manufacturing. The value added 
of intangible assets embedded in those goods is not recorded in the trade statistics of any 
country even if the goods cross national borders.  For example, Foxconn, a major assembler 
for Apple, declares only the production cost of iPhones to the Chinese customs when it ships 
them to the US. Therefore, in the era of GCVs, exports of services of intangibles embedded in 
tangible products manufactured via outsourcing activities of factoryless manufacturers have 
for the most part been missing from conventional trade statistics.  
 
As more and more MNCs in industrialized countries specialize in the creation of intangible 
assets and derive most of their income from the sale of the services of those assets, the gains 
of developed countries from globalization depend more on intangibles than on physical goods. 
To date, developed countries own most patents and international trademarks. Japan, US and 
the European countries combined accounted for 82.5% of patents registered in those three 
countries in 2013 (Durand and Miberg, 2018). It is estimated that in 2019 intangible assets 
accounted for about 27% of the income of manufacturing GVCs in OECD countries (Alsamawi, 
et al, 2020). In terms of the trade between developed and developing countries, trade in tasks 
means the former exchange their services of intangible assets for services of fabrication and 
assembling by the later.  Failing to count trade in services of intangible assets by factoryless 
manufacturers unambiguously understates the extent to which developed nations benefit from 
the unprecedented globalization, and more importantly, it distorts the trade balance between 
the North and the South. The evolution of international trade from the classic cloth-for-wine to 
trade in tasks requires a fundamental reform of the compilation of trade statistics. It is 
imperative that trade in services of intangible assets (embedded in physical products 
assembled/made by foreign contract manufacturers) be included in evaluations of value chain 
trade and of the contribution of intangibles to the 21st century world economy. Expanding the 
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content of trade from tangible products to include services of intangible assets via GVCs would 
provide economists and policy makers with a better understanding of the role of MNCs in the 
global economy, and would enable them to more accurately assess (a) the benefits of 
globalization to developed countries and (b) the trade balances between developed and 
developing countries.  
 
So far, the majority of GVC studies have focused on tasks within the manufacture of tangible 
intermediates and the assembly of parts into final products. Little attention has been paid to the 
tasks in which lead firms specialize and the tasks which add value to final tangible products 
with intangible assets. The OECD TiVA database provides a comprehensive breakdown of 
country origins of intermediate inputs employed in the manufacture of products, but it does not 
include the value added associated with intangible assets. A few studies of servicification 
within GVCs (e.g., Heuser and Mattoo, 2017) narrowly focus on the services embedded in the 
fabrication and assembly stages of the production process (services such as finance, logistics 
and transportation, which are essential elements for the production of physical components and 
final products).  
 
It is important to emphasize here that the mode of exports of intangible assets by factoryless 
manufacturers differs fundamentally from conventional trade in intangible assets. Traditionally, 
owners of intangible assets charge licensing fees or royalties through licensing agreements on 
a variety of intellectual property (IP), including software, patented technologies, trademarks, 
and designs, but factoryless manufacturers such as Apple and Nike do not license their IP to 
third parties. Rather, they use their IP to organize and manage their value chains and outsource 
all fabrication activities to contract manufacturers. They gain returns on their IP by selling 
tangible products assembled/made by contract manufacturers, who are mostly located in the 
developing world.  It is true that factoryless manufacturers tend to transfer the ownership of 
their IP to their foreign affiliates for tax purposes—in which case the earnings derived by the 
affiliates from that IP are booked as part of foreign investment income in current accounts, not 
as export of IP-related services (Jenniges, et al., 2018). This kind of IP arrangement often leads 
to the income of intangible assets unobservable in any country’s gross domestic product (Haan 
and Haynes, 2018).  
 
In this paper, I examine the failure of current trade statistics to record trade in intangibles by 
factoryless manufacturers. I begin with an examination of the official data on Chinese and 
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Japanese imports of laptop computers and mobile phones from the US, and demonstrate that 
Apple sales in the two countries are completely missing from the trade data. In the same fashion, 
I uncover that Nike sales in China are also missing from the country’s imports from the US. 
Then, I analyze a hypothetical case of iPhone X trade to illustrate why conventional trade 
statistics cannot capture exports of services of intangible assets by factoryless manufacturers. 
Finally, I estimate the exports of services of intangibles by the American factoryless 
manufacturers: Apple, Nike, AMD, Cisco and Qualcomm. The estimates show that in 2018 
those five companies exported $70.32 billion in services of intangibles via their tangible 
products assembled/made by foreign contract manufacturers, equivalent to 8.2% of US exports 
in services reported in official trade statistics. In the Chinese market in 2018, Apple, Nike, 
AMD and Qualcomm together exported $27.9 billion in services of their intangible assets, 
equal to 48.9% of US exports in services to China as reported in the official trade statistics for 
that year. If that $27.9 billion were counted as a US export to China (and I believe it should 
be), the US trade deficit with China would shrink by 7.3%.  
 
2. Missing exports of American factoryless manufacturers 
The most salient example of a factoryless manufacturer is Apple, which manages sophisticated 
supply chains globally for the production of trendy technology gadgets: iPods, iPhones, iPads, 
iMacs and Apple Watches.  Initially, Apple produced its own computers, but in the 1990s, it 
sold almost all of its in-house manufacturing facilities to contract manufacturers. To date, 
“substantially all of the Company’s manufacturing is performed in whole or in part by 
outsourcing partners located primarily in Asia” (Apple, 2018). In 2018, the overseas sales of 
Apple amounted to US$153.5 billion (Apple, 2018), equivalent to 10.1% of US exports.  
However, in terms of conventional trade statistics, Apple is not recognized the largest US 
exporter. Boeing, with $71 billion overseas sales in 2018, less than half of Apple's foreign sales, 
has for years been regarded as the largest single US exporter. Even in the list of the top 100 US 
exporters in terms of containerized ocean shipping, compiled by the Journal of Commerce, 
Apple does not appear.  
 
The passion of Chinese consumers for Apple products has turned China into the largest 
overseas market for Apple, accounting in 2018 for $51.94 billion in products in the Chinese 
market. However, if we were to refer to the official data on China’s imports and exports, we 
would conclude that Apple did not even export $1 in products to China. According to the 
United Nations (UN) Comtrade Database, a repository of official international trade statistics 
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provided by UN member states, in 2018 China imported $2.58 million from the US in laptop 
computers, tablets and other portable data processors, as defined in Harmonized System (HS) 
847130; it also imported $1.47 million from the US in mobile phones, as defined in HS 851712. 
Altogether, China imported $4.05 million from the US in laptop computers, mobiles phones 
and other similar products included in the two HS categories. The definitions of the two 
categories would place all Apple products in those two groups, i.e. if Apple exports its products 
to China, those products should be included in the official trade statistics.  
 














cost of Apple 







2015 1.67 58.72 35.17 35.2 21.1 
2016 3.60 48.49 29.53 13.5 8.2 
2017 2.98 44.76 27.53 15.0 9.2 
2018 4.05 51.94 32.05 12.8 7.9 
Source: UNCOMTRADE, Apple form 10-K, and the author’s estimates.  
 
Comparing Apple sales in China with the official trade statistics gives rise to a puzzle: does 
Apple export its products to China?  The $51.94 billion in sales of Apple products is more than 
12,000 times China’s total reported 2018 imports in laptop computers and mobiles from the 
US. The disparity between the official trade data and the Apple sales figure is too large to be 
explained by statistical errors or by Apple’s extraordinarily high gross margins. The sales 
figure includes the income Apple derived from its intangible assets and services imbedded in 
those products—which might contribute to the disparity. Even if we use the manufacturing cost 
of Apple products sold in China as a basis for comparison, the gap remains huge. It is estimated 
that the cost of production of Apple products sold in China in 2018 is approximately $32.05 
billion, almost 8,000 times the official figure for China’s imports from the US in laptop 
computers and mobile phones that year. Table 1 lists China’s imports of laptop computers and 
 7 
mobile phones from the US for the period 2015–2018, and compares them with Apple's annual 
sales in the country, along with the corresponding manufacturing cost.  The disparity is 
significant and present in all of the years. In that light, the only possible explanation of the 
disparity is that the official trade statistics do not at all recognize Apple sales in China as US 
exports. It is clearly evident that current trade statistics are not capable of recording value chain 
trade. As a result, a substantial amount of exports by American factoryless manufacturers are 
“missing” from official trade statistics.  
 














Cost of Apple 








2015 7.30 15.71 9.41 2.2 1.3 
2016 8.61 16.93 10.31 2.0 1.2 
2017 8.24 17.73 10.91 2.2 1.3 
2018 8.69 21.73 13.41 2.5 1.5 
Source: UNCOMTRADE, Apple form 10-K, and the author’s estimates. 
 
As a matter of fact, Apple’s foreign sales are not just missing from the trade statistics tracking 
the bilateral trade between China and the US.  They are also missing from the statistics on US 
trade with all US trading partners. In the case of Japan, for example, the same phenomenon is 
clearly visible for the bilateral trade between Japan and the US. UN Comtrade reports that in 
2018 Japan imported $8.69 million in laptop computers and mobile phones from the US, 
defined by HS 847130 and HS 851712. On the other hand, according to the annual report of 
Apple (2018), its sales in Japan totaled $21.73 billion, 2,500 times the value of Japanese 
imports from the US in those two HS groups. It is estimated that the total manufacturing cost 
of Apple products sold in Japan in the year amounted to $13.41 billion, which is more than 
1,500 times the value of the Japanese imports reported by UN Comtrade. Table 2 displays 
Japanese imports in laptop computers and mobile phones from the US from 2015 to 2018, and 
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compares them with Apple annual sales in Japan, along with the corresponding manufacturing 
cost.  There is an immediately visible, dramatic disparity between the Japanese imports and 
Apple’s sales and cost figures for that period.  The Japanese case is another demonstration of 
the failure of conventional trade statistics to record trade in intangibles via GVCs. 
 

















cost of Nike 




2015 107.25 3.07 1.66 28.6 15.4 
2016 146.35 3.79 2.04 25.7 13.9 
2017 119.77 4.24 2.35 35.4 19.6 
2018 209.33 5.13 2.89 24.5 13.8 
Source: UNCOMTRADE, Nike form 10-K, and the author’s estimates.  
 
The missing export phenomenon also exists in the trade of labor intensive goods such as apparel 
and footwear. According to UN Comtrade Database, in 2018 China imported $209.33 million 
in apparel and footwear from the US, as defined in HS 62 and HS 64.  Comparing this figure 
with Nike sales in China raises the same question: does Nike export its products to China? 
China is the largest overseas market for Nike. In 2018, Nike sold $5.19 billion in athletic 
apparel and footwear to the Chinese consumers, which is almost 25 times larger than China’s 
imports in apparel and footwear from the US in the year. It is estimated that the total 
manufacturing cost of those Nike products is about $2.89 billion, roughly 14 times larger than 
the value of the Chinese imports reported by the official trade statistics. The definitions of HS 
62 and 64 imply that, Nike products should be classified into the two categories by trade 
statistics if they were shipped to China from the US. Table 3 displays China’s imports in 
apparel and footwear from the US during the period 2015-2018 along with Nike sales in the 
Chinese market and the corresponding manufacturing cost. The huge gap between the Chinese 
imports and the Nike sales existed in all of the years. Nike is the largest seller of athletic 
footwear and apparel in the world, however, “virtually all Nike products are manufactured by 
independent contractors. Nearly all footwear and apparel products are produced outside the 
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United States” (Nike, 2018), which explains why Nike sales in China add nothing to US exports 
to China from the perspective of conventional trade statistics.  
 
3. In the age of GVCs, trade flows no longer match income flows  
There are two reasons for the discrepancy between the picture presented in conventional trade 
statistics and the reality that American factoryless manufacturers such as Apple and Nike 
actually export billions of dollars goods to the global market every year. First, American 
factoryless manufacturers generally outsource the manufacturing of their products to factories 
located outside of the US.  Their products, says iPhones and Nike shoes, are exported to 
overseas markets from where they are manufactured, not from the US. They do not have to 
cross American borders to enter foreign markets. Hence, American customs cannot record the 
shipments of those products to foreign countries as US exports.  For instance, all Apple 
products sold in the Chinese market are directly shipped from the Chinese factories of Foxconn, 
Wistron, Pegatron, Luxshare Precision and etc.; they are not shipped from the American 
continent.  Second, what American factoryless manufacturers sell to foreign consumers is the 
services of their intangible assets, such as product design, brand, patented technologies and 
supply chain management know-how. When foreign contractors export products manufactured 
for those American companies to international markets, they only declare the cost of 
manufacturing, which does not include the value added attributed to the intangible assets. 
Therefore, the value added by American factoryless manufacturers via intangible assets is not 
recorded by customs in other countries—and hence it actually constitutes a missing US export 
(Xing, 2020b). 
 
Now, I take up the case of trade in the iPhone X assembled in China, to offer an intuitive 
explanation of the failure of conventional trade statistics to track exports of intangible assets 
by factoryless manufacturers. Assuming that an iPhone X is sold neither in China nor in the 
US, but somewhere in the rest of the world. Figure 1 depicts trade and income flows between 
China, the US and the rest of the world related to the manufacture and sales of that iPhone X. 
In the figure, blue lines indicate flows of goods associated with the production and export of 
the iPhone X, while red lines denote corresponding flows of income. The retail price of the 
iPhone X is assumed to be $1,000. A teardown analysis (Xing, 2020a) reveals that the 
production cost, which comprises the costs of all parts and assembly service, amounts to 
$409.25, and that Apple contributes $590.75 of value added to the phone through its intangible 
assets (iOS operating system, brand, product design, marketing and retail networks). To make 
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the iPhone, Foxconn in China imports US$76.5 and $228.75 worth of parts and components, 
respectively, from the US and the rest of the world. As a result, the sale of a US$1,000 iPhone 
X gives rise to a total of $714.5 in export volume in the world economy, i.e. the sum of $305.25 
in parts exported to China and the $409.25 value of the iPhone X when exported by China. It 
is worthy of note that the official trade statistics report only the US$76.5 in parts shipped 
directly from the US to China as a US export, which is about one tenth of the total export value 
generated by the sale of the $1,000 iPhone X abroad. Unambiguously, the trade statistics 
greatly underestimate the contribution of the iPhone X to US exports. 
 















Source: Xing (2020a) 
 
Examination of income flows, illustrated by the red lines in Figure 1, reveals that the income 
flows do not match the trade flows. Specifically, (1) China only received $104 for parts made 
in China and for assembly, despite the officially reported $409.25 export; (2) the trade statistics 
show that China imported $305.25 in parts from the US and the rest of the world for assembly 
of the iPhone X, but there is no corresponding income flowing from China to those regions, 
because Apple paid the suppliers in the US and the rest of the world directly; and (3) from its 
sales of the iPhone X in the rest of the world, the US received $1,000 income from abroad, 
although there is no corresponding trade flow matching the $1,000 received. This hypothetical 















$590.75 intangible service   
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value of physical goods crossing borders, and cannot trace exports of services of intangible 
assets embedded in physical goods.  
 
GVCs have evolved into the dominant mode of production and international trade. The 
international division of labor along value chains, as illustrated by the case of the iPhone (Xing, 
2020a) and the smile curve (Meng, et al, 2020), suggests that MNCs from developed nations 
generally specialize in the creation of intangible assets, while firms from developing nations 
perform tasks related to material fabrication and product manufacturing. Trade in tasks means 
international exchanges involving services of intangible assets and activities related to the 
manufacture of tangible products. Hence, from the perspective of value chain trade, exports of 
services by factoryless manufacturers via tangible goods assembled/made by foreign contract 
manufacturers should be considered a new type of trade in services.  
 
4. In the age of GVCs, trade flows no longer match income flows  
To measure the exports of services of intangible assets by a factoryless manufacturer, I follow 
the approach used in Xing (2020b). Generally, the total value added 𝑇𝑉 of products sold by a 
factoryless manufacturer in the global market can be written as  
 
𝑇𝑉 = 𝑉! + 𝑉" + 𝑉# + 𝑉$ + 𝑉% (1) 
 
where 𝑉! is the value added of parts manufactured in foreign countries; 𝑉" is the value added 
of parts produced in the home country of the factoryless manufacturer; 𝑉# is assembly cost; 𝑉$ 
is the value added of the sale services provided by local employees in foreign destination 
markets; and 𝑉% is the value added attributed to the factoryless manufacturer’s intangible assets 
(e.g., brand name, design, software). Regardless of whether in the real world foreign made 
parts contain the materials or components supplied by the home country or vice versa, 
theoretically, the total value added of any product can always be decomposed as in equation 
(1). As explained earlier, when parts and assembled final products are shipped between 
countries, 𝑉!, 𝑉" and 𝑉# are automatically recorded as trade flows. The value added 𝑉$ and 𝑉%, 
however, can only be realized after the factoryless manufacturer sells its products to foreign 
customers. 𝑉% denotes the service value of the intangibles embedded in the products and owned 
by the factoryless manufacturer, i.e., what the factoryless manufacturer sells to the foreign 
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consumers—which is an export from the perspective of the factoryless manufacturer’s home 
country. 𝑉% is an undocumented export that is missing from official trade statistics.  
 
The export of services of intangible assets by the factoryless manufacturer, 𝑉%, can be estimated 
using the formula  
𝑉% = 𝛽𝑆 − 𝑉$    (2) 
where 𝛽 is the average gross margin of the factoryless manufacturer’s products and 𝑆 is total 
overseas sales. Gross margin is a company’s total sales revenue minus the costs of goods, 
divided by total sales revenue. In other words, 𝛽𝑆 is equal to the difference between the sales 
revenue and the total cost of manufacturing tangible products—the sum of 𝑉!, 𝑉" and 𝑉#. To 
estimate the exports of intangible assets by factoryless manufacturers, I select five American 
companies for examination: Apple, Nike, AMD, Cisco, and Qualcomm. Apple and Nike are 
two famous factoryless manufacturers of consumer goods. AMD, Cisco and Qualcomm are 
fabless semiconductor manufacturers. Qualcomm is “a global leader in the development and 
commercialization of foundational technologies and products used in mobile devices and other 
wireless products, including network equipment, broadband gateway equipment and consumer 
electronic devices,” and Qualcomm's semiconductor business primarily utilizes a fabless 
production model; Qualcomm does not own or operate foundries for the production of silicon 
wafers from which integrated circuits are made (Qualcomm, 2018). Cisco “designs and sells a 
broad range of technologies that have been powering the Internet since 1984.”  It presently uses 
a variety of independent third-party companies to provide services related to printed-circuit 
board assembly, in-circuit testing, product repair, and product assembly. Cisco’s arrangements 
with contract manufacturers generally provide for quality, cost, and delivery requirements, as 
well as manufacturing process terms, such as continuity of supply; inventory management” 
(Cisco, 2018). AMD produces x86 microprocessors; chipsets; discrete and integrated graphics 
processing units (GPU), and professional GPUs; and servers, embedded processors and semi-
custom System-on-Chip (SoC) products and technology for game consoles. It outsources 
board-level graphics product manufacturing to third party manufacturers, such as 
GlobalFoundries and Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) (AMD, 2018). 
 
The data needed for the estimations (foreign sales, gross margins and expenses of 
administrative and sales) are taken from the annual reports (Form 10-K) of the companies 
examined. I assume that trade statistics include the service revenues and license incomes 
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derived by those companies from foreign markets. The revenues from services and license 
income are excluded in the estimation. The foreign sales data presented in Table 4 consist only 
of the revenues from tangible products. In 2018, Apple sold $132.0 billion in products abroad, 
the highest among the five companies, with a gross profit margin of 38.2%, while Nike’s 
foreign sales amounted to $21.5 billion with an average gross margin of 43.8%. Excluding 
licensing revenues, Qualcomm obtained $16.9 billion in revenue from overseas markets with 
an average gross margin of 55%. Together the five companies derived $190.7 billion in revenue 
from overseas markets in 2018 (Table 4).  
 
Table 4. Estimated exports of services of intangibles by the five American factoryless 
manufacturers in 2018 (billion US dollars) 
Company Apple Nike AMD Cisco Qualcomm Total 
Foreign 
sales 
132.0 21.5 5.2 15.1 16.9 190.7 
Exports 46.6 6.0 1.8 7.7 8.2 70.3 
Source: Forms 10-K of Apple, Nike, AMD, Cisco and Qualcomm; and the author’s estimates. 
 
𝑉$ represents the retail services provided by local employees in foreign destination markets, 
for example, the retail services provided by the Chinese employees of Apple stores in China. 
The annual reports of those companies disclose only aggregate numbers for sales and 
administrative expenses. Since tangible assets such as brands, software and design have the 
character of economies of scale, and since most of the administrative and marketing activities 
are done at the headquarters, I assume for these estimations that marginal sales and 
administrative expenditure in foreign markets are 50% of average sales and administrative 
expenses. Table 4 reports estimated exports of services of intangibles by the five American 
companies in 2018. Specifically, of Apple’s $132 billion in foreign sales, $46.6 billion was 
attributed to its intangible assets, such as the famous Apple brand, iOS software, elegant and 
trendy design, and other services.  This figure represents the value of what Apple itself actually 
sold to foreign consumers via its tangible products assembled by foreign contractors. It is an 
exported service of Apple’s intangibles but it is not recorded in the current form of trade 
statistics. Similarly, through its sales of athletic footwear, apparel and other tangible products, 
Nike exported $6.0 billion in services of its intangible assets to foreign consumers in 2018. 
Cisco and Qualcomm had lower foreign sales than Nike, but their gross profit margins were 
 14 
60.7% and 55.0% respectively, much higher than that of Nike, and their exports were higher 
too. Cisco exported $7.7 billion in services of intangible assets through its $15.1 billion in sales 
of hardware in overseas markets; Qualcomm exported $8.2 billion in services of intangibles 
through its sales of $16.9 billion in chips to foreign customers. AMD, the smallest among the 
five companies, is estimated to have exported $1.8 billion in services attributed to its intangible 
assets. Together, by selling foreign customers tangible products assembled/made by foreign 
contract manufacturers, the five American factoryless manufacturers exported $70.3 billion in 
services of intangible assets in 2018.  
 
Table 5. The five American factoryless manufacturers and US trade in 2018 (billion US 
dollars) 













862.4 932.7 8.2% -579.9 -509.6 12.1% 
Source: US Census of Bureau and the author’s estimates; *: including both goods and services. 
 
According to the practice of conventional trade statistics, trade in services include cross-border 
sales of research and development services, royalties and license fees for IP. The accumulation 
of intangibles is a result of research and development activities. Brand development, product 
design and marketing are service oriented tasks. To assess the significance of the exports of 
services of intangibles by the five American factoryless manufacturers, I compare the estimated 
exports of those companies with US exports in services and overall trade balance reported by 
the official trade statistics. In 2018, the US exported $862.4 billion in services. The $70.3 
billion in exports in services of intangibles by the five companies is equivalent to 8.2% of US 
exports in services.  If that were counted as a US export in services, US service exports would 
rise to $932.7 billion, and in turn the overall US trade deficit would fall 12.1% to $509.6 billion 
(Table 5).   
 
5. American factoryless manufacturers and the US-China trade 
According to US Census Bureau statistics, in 2018 the US had a $420 billion trade deficit in 
commodity trade, amounting to almost half of the US trade deficit in goods. That persistent 
and rising trade deficit triggered the on-going trade war between the two countries. Besides 
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macroeconomic factors such as differences in savings rates, the incompatibility between 
current trade statistics and value chain trade is one of major causes of the apparently huge trade 
imbalance between the two nations. Several studies (e.g., Xing and Detert, 2010; Johnson and 
Noguera, 2012; Koopman, Wang and Wei, 2014; Xing, 2020a) have documented the statistical 
distortion of the US-China trade balance. While foreign value added inflates China’s trade 
surplus with the US, the emergence of factoryless manufacturers has led to underestimation of 
US exports to China. By outsourcing all fabrication tasks to foreign contract manufacturers, 
many American firms have adopted a new business model for the marketing of products in the 
Chinese market. Instead of selling US made goods, they sell products built around American 
brands, designs and technologies, but made/assembled in China or third countries. Every year, 
American factoryless manufacturers sell Chinese customers billions of dollars in tangible 
products such as iPhones, Nike shoes, AMD CPUs and Qualcomm chipsets, and earn billions 
of dollars from the Chinese market as a return on their intangible assets and services. In 2018, 
Apple’s net sales in China totaled $51.9 billion; Nike, Qualcomm and AMD sold $5.1 billion, 
$15.1 billion and $2.5 billion respectively in products in China. The total Chinese revenue of 
the four American companies was $74.6 billion (Table 6). Their extraordinarily high gross 
profit margins, e.g., 43.8% on Nike products and 55% on Qualcomm semiconductor products, 
imply that those American companies captured a significantly large share of the value added 
of the products sold in the Chinese market. What those American companies are actually 
selling to Chinese customers are the services of their intangible assets.  Such business activities, 
however, are not treated as a US export to China because conventional trade statistics are 
designed for the classic cloth-for-wine trade, not for value chain trade. Compared to exports of 
agricultural products such as corn and soybeans, or of airplanes, exports of services of 
intangible assets via GVCs create both jobs and income for the American economy.  Those 
exports should be considered a new type of export in the age of GVCs.    
 
To evaluate the importance of American factoryless manufacturers in the bilateral trade 
between the US and China, I apply equation (2) to estimate the exports of services of intangible 
assets by Apple, Nike, AMD and Qualcomm to China in 2018. The estimates indicate that 
Apple earned $18.3 billion from its $51.9 billion sales in China, in the form of a return on its 
intangible assets (iOS, great brand, trendy design, marketing and supply chain management 
know-how). In terms of bilateral payments, that $18.3 billion is the value of the purchase by 
Chinese consumers of the services of Apple, a US export to China via the value chains of Apple. 
The export of Nike’s service to China is estimated at $1.4 billion. Of Qualcomm’s $15.1 billion 
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sales in China, $7.5 billion is attributed to the value added of Qualcomm's intangible assets, 
and can be regarded as the fabless semiconductor manufacturer's service export to China. In 
the same fashion, I calculate that AMD exported $0.8 billion in services of intangibles to China 
that year. In a nutshell, the four factoryless manufacturers jointly exported $27.9 billion in 
services of intangible assets to Chinese customers via tangible products in 2018 (Table 6).  
 
  Table 6. Estimated exports of services of intangibles by selected American factoryless 
manufacturers to China (billion dollar) 
Company Apple Nike AMD Qualcomm Total 
Sales in China 51.9 5.1 2.5 15.1 74.6 
Exports 18.3 1.4 0.8 7.4 27.9 
Source: Forms 10-K of Apple, Nike, AMD and QCOM; and the author’s estimates. 
 
Compared with US exports in services to China as reported by the official trade statistics, the 
exports of the four American factoryless manufacturers to China are too large to be ignored. 
According to the US Census Bureau, the US exported $57.1 billion in services to China in 2018. 
If the exports of the four American companies were counted as part of US exports to China, 
US service exports to China would increase by 48.9% to $85.0 billion, and the US overall trade 
deficit with China (including both goods and services) would shrink by 7.3% to $352.1 billion 
(Table 7). Clearly, adding the exports of services of intangibles by American factoryless 
manufacturers would substantially increase the volume of US exports to China and reduce the 
US trade deficit. This is not a statistical trick or an academic exercise for artificially narrowing 
the trade imbalance between the two nations. It is an adjustment necessary to make trade 
statistics compatible with value chain trade. The logic for doing so is straightforward. When 
Chinese consumers and firms purchase tangible products of American factoryless 
manufacturers, such as iPhones, Nike shoes, Qualcomm chipsets and AMD CPUs, they pay 
not only the cost of manufacturing those products, but also the value added associated with the 
services of intangible assets embedded in those products. In other words, Chinese consumers 
and firms actually purchase the services of intangible assets of American factoryless 
manufacturers, similar to purchasing made in the US goods, but accomplished through 
sophisticated value chains rather than conventional trade in goods and services.  
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Table 7. Selected American factoryless manufacturers and US trade with China in 2018 
(billion US dollar) 
US exports in services to China 
 
US trade deficit with China* 
Official  








57.1 85.0 48.9% -380.0 -352.1 7.3% 
Source: US Census Bureau and the author’s calculation; *: including trade in goods and 
services.  
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
To export means to sell domestically made products to foreign markets. Factoryless 
manufacturers sell services of their intangible assets embedded in tangible goods to foreign 
customers. That kind of activity meets the definition of export. Exports are important for 
national economies because they create jobs and income for domestic economies. The earnings 
gained by factoryless manufacturers from the global market support highly paid jobs in their 
home countries in areas including research and development, product design, marketing, and 
supply chain management. It is the global market that offers a space where factoryless 
manufacturers can maximize the scalability of their IP. Failing to count exports of factoryless 
manufacturers leads to underestimation of the contribution of those firms to national economies 
and often leads to serious distortion of bilateral trade balances.  As shown here, Apple’s 
international sales are not counted as US exports at all. That strange phenomenon reflects a 
failure of trade statistics to realistically measure value chain trade, a dominant form of 
international trade in the 21st century.  
 
The estimates of this study suggest that American factoryless manufacturers have contributed 
significantly to US exports. The 2018 exports of services of intangible assets by Apple, Nike, 
AMD, Cisco and Qualcomm amounted $70.3 billion, equivalent to 8.5% of the official record 
of US exports in services that year. If those exports were regarded as US exports, the US trade 
deficit would fall by 12.1%. In terms of the bilateral trade between US and China, Apple, Nike, 
AMD and Qualcomm sold $27.9 billion services of their intangible assets to Chinese customers 
in 2018, equal to almost half of US exports in services to China as reported in official statistics. 
If those exports were counted as US exports to China, the bilateral trade imbalance would be 
reduced by 7.3%.  
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This discussion applies to both American MNCs and MNCs from other developed nations. For 
example, Dyson of the UK, UNIQLO of Japan, and ZARA of Spain have adopted the new 
business model of selling the services of intangible assets via tangible products assembled/ 
made by foreign contractors. This new trend in recent decades is a result of GVC development. 
Expanding the scope of trade from tangibles to include intangibles is essential for a more 
accurate understanding of the benefits of globalization, in particular the benefits to nations 
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